This case was brought against the state of Oklahoma by a convicted Felon who faced sterilization under an Oklahoma Statute. The court reversed the order of sterilization stating that the sterilization was a violation of the man’s fourteenth amendment right to equal protection. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion, which emphasized the constitutional gravity of the assumptions made by the statute. Namely, that the law had a eugenic purpose for which there was no scientific background. He also cautioned against using people, even criminals, for ‘biological experiments’ in order to prevent the birth of future criminals.

Justice Jackson wrote the opinion of the court affirming a directed verdict of the district court that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial in the petitioner’s suit to collect benefits from a government life insurance policy. The Supreme Court stated that the intent to defraud could be presumed from the petitioner’s deceased husband’s own admissions. Therefore there was no need for trial, and affirmed the directed verdict.

Jackson wrote the opinion of the court for this decision that affirmed the constitutionality of charges from stock yards. The Supreme Court also clarified that these charges should not be within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the future.

In this case the majority of the court overturned First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U.S. 312, removing a perceived protection of the 14th Amendment from taxation by more than one state. Justice Jackson dissented on the basis that the majority opinion was not well reasoned, and arbitrarily decided. Jackson called the over turning of First National the making of the proverbial jump from the frying pan into the fire referring to the court changing their opinion on taxation being based on a person's domicile,or a company's state of incorporation. Jackson criticized this move, arguing that there should have been more analysis of what the actual effects on individuals would likely be, and from this analysis rule that a person’s domicile should be the appropriate place from which to tax.

In this case a transportation company had been in the process of obtaining a certificate, as a ‘grandfathered’ company under Section 206 (a) of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act for having operated continuously from June 1, 1935 until the date of the hearing before the commission when they went bankrupt and were forced to cease operations. There is an exception in the act for companies that ceased to operate due to factors outside of their control. The lower courts found that the bankruptcy was a break in operations that disqualified the company from obtaining a certificate, and the majority of the supreme court affirmed that decision. Justice Jackson dissented from this case, vehemently arguing that the bankruptcy experienced by the company was precisely the kind of event, for which the exception was written, and therefore the decision should be reversed and the decision granted.

Miles was the administratrix of her deceased husband’s estate and filed a Federal Employer’s Liability Act lawsuit against Illinois Central Railroad Co. on her husband’s behalf. Miles filed in Missouri State court, and Illinois Central Railroad Co. sought to stop the suit and filed to do so in Tennessee court, arguing that the fatal accident occurred in Tennessee and moving the trial to Missouri would be inconvenient and expensive. The Supreme Court ruled in Miles’ favor, saying that this injunction was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion, recognizing Congress’s power to allow plaintiffs more jurisdictional latitude when choosing venue even if it imposes a greater burden on the employer.

Justice Jackson wrote for the majority reversing a decision by the New York Court of Appeals, that had upheld an injunction against the Baker & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 for picketing businesses, which used non union drivers. The picketing was reasonable, the placards held were truthful, and there was no evidence that continued picketing would lead to violence, force or coercion. For those reasons the court found the injunction to be an unconstitutional limitation on the union’s rights to exercise free speech.

This was a patent infringement case in which the trial court first found the patent to be invalid because the design was being made and used two years before the patent application documents were filed. Justice Jackson wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court finding the patent invalid by the same reasoning as the trial court. Jackson emphasized key elements of the trial that he felt were over looked by the court of appeals in their decision.

In this case D’Oench, Duhme & Co. used a bond that had no actual value as collateral to obtain a loan from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC]. There was a question of conflict of laws when the judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court, of whether Illinois, Missouri or Federal Law was the appropriate Law under which to judge the case. The Supreme Court used the Federal Reserve act in order to find the petitioner liable under that federal law, because the FDIC reasonably relied upon that collateral when making its loan.

In Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, he called on the court to make a more explicit answer to the question on the rule of law. He thought that the court should have applied federal ‘common’ law doctrine of estoppel to come to the same ruling.

In this case Carolina Carriers Corp. sought an exception under the ‘grandfather clause’ of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 for bona fide common carriers operating before 1935. Carolina was granted a very specific exemption by the commerce commission, for the territories and goods where and which they carried on a regular basis prior to 1935 would be exempted. Carolina sued for a full exemption, and affirming a lower court the Supreme Court granted the full exemption.
Justice Jackson dissented, criticizing the court for making a ruling on the case. What constitutes or does not constitute ‘grandfathering’ and ‘exemptions’ should be left to the discretion of the drafters of the legislation, and was not an appropriate place to utilize judicial review.